By Pradip Phanjoubam
(The following is a report the author wrote six years ago after a conducted tour of Tripura for senior journalists of Manipur and Assam, organised by the Army. The report is being reproduced as a retrospective glance back to see much has developed or not so in the time which have elapsed)
Insurgency in Tripura is veritably on its last leg. At least that is what it appears to be at this moment. A lot many of the underground cadres, belonging to all of the organisations operating in the state, most prominently National Liberation Front of Tripura, NLFT, All Tripura Tiger Force, ATTF, and Borok National Council of Tripura, BNCT, are surrendering in an ever increasing frequency and number.
It also became evident even during very brief interaction sessions with several of these surrendered militants at various Army camps in the length and breath of the state, in a day`™s tour facilitated by the Indian Army which arranged for the service of an Army helicopter for senior journalists and editors from Manipur, Nagaland and South Assam, that the militant morale across the board is in very low ebb.
The words of one of the surrendered NLFT, Sanjay Jamatia, 29, at the Assam Rifles headquarters at Kanchipura in North Tripura elaborated this state of mind in explaining why he surrendered: `There was no food to eat, no clothes to wear. No hope that we would ever succeed.`
At this camp, in the past few days there had been four surrenders and they joined another 100 or so who had come out of the jungles ahead of them. The weapons the four surrendered also were pretty eloquent about the condition that Jamatia described in his brief sketch of the rebellion. There was a rundown Self Loading Rifle, SLR, which anybody would doubt is still in working condition, two single round country made pistols, a dozen or two assorted ammunitions, a half dozen or so jungle knives, linen backpacks, and other improvised jungle survival paraphernalia.
If Napoleon`™s famous statement that an army marches on its stomach holds good for insurgents as well, then it must be concluded that this rag tag rebel army has lost its stomach `“ both literally, as the source of their revenue seems to have been effectively cut off by effective counter insurgency measures, and metaphorically because the cadres do not any more seem to have the fire of rebellion left in their bellies.
Jamatia said they did occasionally get to see their leaders while they were in the jungles, but for most of the time they were on their own, with their leaders away in the relative safety and comforts of towns and cities in Bangladesh.
However, tried as some of the journalist did, even to the extent of feeding words into their mouths, they showed little evidence they were bitter with their former leaders or colleagues. The overwhelming sense was that it was utter hopelessness that led them to decide to surrender.
This may also explain why they seem to have little interest in being absorbed into the counter insurgency whirlwind. They were also little afraid of reprisal by their former colleagues. All they wanted was to live a normal life again, and a means to livelihood. `The insurgency exists only in the jungles, and we will be safe in the cities and towns,` they said.
Officers of the Army that the pressmen interacted with, agreed on this point.
One other thing was also written large on the faces of the surrendered cadres, most of them still in their worn-out camouflage uniforms `“ the indelible scars of a past hopelessly and awfully gone wrong and the uncertainty of a new future ahead.
On being queried, Jamatia said in broken Hindi he joined the rebellion to fight for freedom but did not answer whether he still believed in that freedom. Obviously, like the rest, he became disillusioned running after the intangible and now wants only a tangible respectable life.
At Teliamura camp, Jarma Charan, a former lieutenant with the NLFT, told the media team that he most prefers to be absorbed into the security forces to become a respectable soldier. If not, he would like to be running a farm.
This sentiment was echoed by the rest of the surrendered militants. `We wish the government would give us the skills and resettle us in community farms where we can work and earn respectable livelihoods together through our sweat and toil,` is the common refrain.
Whatever may be the hiccups, there is no denying that counter insurgency measures in Tripura is a success. The proof of this pudding is already evident and it does seem inevitable at this moment that insurgency in the state would be on an incremental basis marginalised in the years ahead.
The question that follows is, can this example be emulated in other insurgency torn states? In attempting the answer, the factors behind the Tripura success will be have to be analysed more closely.
At every Army and Assam Rifles headquarters the journalists were taken, the near consensual voice amongst authoritative officers is that the Army could not have done what it has done all by itself, and that it was the all out cooperation from the Tripura government that smoothed out so many of the stubborn creases faced by such projects in other states.
Commandant of 15th Assam Rifles Col. A.K. Chatterjee, citing example of this cooperation said the first and foremost show of seriousness of intent by the Tripura government in this new counter insurgency thrust is the generous rehabilitation package it has announced.
Every surrendered militant, while he undergoes vocational training as per his inclination and aptitude under the Army, gets Rs. 3000 a month, which will be credited into a recurring fix deposit account in his name. The interest from this amount would meet his maintenance cost while still in training with the Army. When he is through and is ready to enter his new vocation, the matured fixed deposit would give him Rs. 1.5 lakhs to start off on his new journey.
`Many of these boys would be allowed to participate in recruitment rallies of the Army, police and other security establishments, so that if they qualify, they would get into these jobs,` Col. Chatterjee said.
Col. Chatterjee also was confident many of them would actually make it. `They are already close to the groove, having had very similar trainings in their past callings. Since most of them are tribals, their qualification mark would also be just Class-8 pass, which most of them are. The most formidable stumbling blocks for many of them would be age, as they would become automatically disqualified after 27,` he said.
The government also does not unnecessarily interfere with the Army`™s functioning, he said. `There is a unified command to coordinate counter insurgency operations between the Army and other civil security organisations, and nobody is designated as the overall commander so as to avoid unnecessary protocol and ego frictions. Still, each organisation functions as a separate unit but in coordination and cooperation with each other.` Col. Chatterjee said.
The approach has been yielding results and has shown immense promise. The Army applies the `stick`, keeping the rebels on the run and constantly under pressure. `The rebel morale was deflated considerably after the Army in recent operations `neutralised`™ (a euphemism for elimination) many important functionaries of the rebel forces,` Col Chatterjee added.
The government couples this up with the `carrot` in the shape of a handsome and `sincere` rehabilitation package.
The Army itself has also been doling its own bit of `carrot` job. In projects that it calls WHAM (winning hearts and minds), it has also been reaching out to various villages, building playgrounds, village approach roads etc.
Over and above this, there is all out support from the local population in the endeavour, Army spokesmen said.
This could be because the ideology behind tribal militancy in the state runs counter to the interest of the overwhelming majority Bengali population.
Whatever the background of demography upsets and consequent alteration of power structures in the state, the fact is, militancy in Tripura today has become a marginal affair, restricted to the jungles and remote regions of the state`™s peripheries, so much so that the cities and towns are almost oblivious of the unrest, except occasionally through newspaper reportage of stray incidents of violence.
We did not have much time during the one-day trip to interact with independent observers, but some of us did manage to get some inputs, basically from journalist friends based in the state.
According to them, the clean, relatively corruption free image of Tripura`™s political leadership has helped considerably. Whatever else may be its reputation, the communists which have been in power in the state for decades together now, are known for neutrality on the ethnic question too.
Many of the state`™s chief ministers, notably Nripen Chakrovarty, actually by choice lived Spartan lives and retired and died as ordinary, less than rich, middle class citizens.
With a relatively corruption free political establishment, the bureaucracy too has remained relatively free of the same scourge.
What you have then is a functioning government, with visible signs of good governance everywhere for all to appreciate. Hence, roads and highways are well made and maintained. City garbage are cleared, power supply is good, and even during the lean seasons, residents of Agartala city suffer only two hours load shedding a day, drinking water is adequate etc. Not the least, the law and order situation is under control, extending working hours for private businesses well into non daylight hours, long after most other north eastern cities are shut and fast asleep.