LTTE created cyanide cult

(Book Review: Sri Lanka The New Country)

By Anil Bhat

Theravada, `the teaching of the elders` or `the ancient teaching`, the oldest surviving Buddhist school `” founded in India and considered to be relatively conservative, and generally closest to early Buddhism `” has, for many centuries, been the predominant religion of Sri Lanka, accounting for about 70 per cent of the population.

Following the exit of the British, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism gradually gained ground to the extent of becoming discriminatory against minorities, particularly Tamils , as reflected by the Sinhala Only Act passed in 1956. While colonisation of the Eastern Province inhabited mainly by Tamils had already begun in the 1950s, the Republican Constitution adopted in 1972, according Buddhism privileged status and denying the protection to minorities as the earlier Constitution did, came as a further shock. Shortly afterwards, `standardisation` of marks for university admissions, meaning non-Sinhalas had to get higher marks, added further insult to injury. With the response by the State to peaceful protest by Tamils often being violent, the last straw that broke the camel`™s back `” the rise of Tamil militancy `” was the Black July killings of 1983.

On July 23, 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE also known as the Tamil Tigers), a separatist militant organisation under Velupillai Prabhakaran began its bloody insurgent fight aiming to create an independent Tamil state named Tamil Eelam in the north and the east of the island.

When escalation of level of the conflict in Sri Lanka led to the pouring of refugees into India, in 1987, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, took the decisive step to push the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord through and on the request of then Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), formed under the accord`™s mandate, was inducted into Sri Lanka.

Maj. Gen. Raj Mehta was serving in directorate general of military operations, Army Headquarters, when the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka and maintained his interest. Lost Victory is the result of his sustained incisive research.

As per the terms of the accord, IPKF`™s main task was to disarm not just the LTTE, but also all the different militant groups. It was to be quickly followed by the formation of an Interim Administrative Council. IPKF was initially not expected to be involved in any significant combat, but within a few months, it became embroiled in battle with the LTTE to enforce peace. The differences which cropped up owing to LTTE trying to dominate the Interim Administrative Council and also refusing to disarm, a pre-condition to enforce peace in the island, and soon led to the LTTE attacking the IPKF. The prolonged 32 months of IPKF`™s Operation Pawan was fought at a disproportionately high cost of the lives of over 1,100 Indian Amy personnel. This was largely because of a flawed political approach, hurry and adhocism which also meant lack of preparation and lack of vital and even basic intelligence and maps for IPKF in the face of the LTTE, which was highly trained in guerilla warfare, extensive use of explosives and motivated as well as its ruthlessnes of using women and child soldiers to fight. Following the election of the Vishwanath Pratap Singh government in India and on the request of the then newly-elected Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, the IPKF de-inducted from Sri Lanka in March 1990. Whereas Rajiv Gandhi visited Sri Lanka during Operation Pawan and even escaped a crude attack by Sri Lankan Navy sailor, what was most disgraceful was the government`™s cold reception to the IPKF, when it returned back home.

For almost 26 years, the insurgency brought misery upon the people, ruined the environment and economy of the country and took a toll on 80,000 lives. 32 countries, including the United States, India, Australia, Canada and the member nations of the European Union declared LTTE a terrorist organisation. After two decades of fighting and three failed attempts at peace talks, a ceasefire was declared in December 2001, with its agreement, facilitated by international mediation, signed in 2002. Then again, hostilities were renewed in late 2005 and the conflict intensified. This time major military offensives against the LTTE beginning in July 2006, drove the LTTE out of the entire Eastern province, after which it declared to `resume their freedom struggle to achieve statehood`. In 2007, the offensive shifted to the north and on January 2, 2008, the Sri Lanka government formally announced its withdrawal from the ceasefire agreement accusing the LTTE of repeatedly violating it. Thereafter, Sri Lanka`™s Armed Forces became quite effctive by destroying a number of LTTE`™s large arms smuggling vessels and an international crackdown on the funding it. Eventually, the entire area previously controlled by the Tamil Tigers, including their de-facto capital Kilinochchi, main military base Mullaitivu and the entire A9 highway, was captured leading to the LTTE to finally admitting defeat on May 17, 2009.

Velupillai Prabhakaran of Velvettithurai, inspired by his teacher, Venugopal, began his fight, creating the cult of the cyanide capsule necklace and `blow yourself up` suicide bombers and believing in `Nature is my Friend, Life is my Philosopher and History my Guide` became a larger-than-life figure. Over the years he became extremely elusive and even callous enough to remain very safe himself, sending thousands of his cadres, including young boys and girls, to die. Ironically, he is reported to have died without the cyanide capsule on his neck. Over 60% of LTTE cadres were below the age of 16. So, when Padma Rao Sundarji got to meet Prabhakaran and asked him about recruiting/forcing underage youth into LTTE, his denial was an outright lie.

While the LTTE under Prabhakaran`™s directions killed Rajiv Gandhi, an interesting finding of the Jain Commission as recorded in Justice Milap Chand Jain`™s conclusion, reads `Ramesh Dalal`™s (author of Rajiv Gandh`™s Assassination: The Mystery Unfolds, UBS) evidence does establish the involvement of Chandraswami in the assassination.` He also recommended a further probe and subsequently, the Central Government tabled the Action Taken Report (ATR) in 1998 and constituted the Multi Disciplinary Monitoring Committee (MDMA) in 1999.

The book, in four parts, with 22 chapters packed with lots of details and thereby quite useful for reference, ends with a copy of the letter of resignation of Sri Lanka`™s former Army Chief, Gen. G.S.C. Fonseka, who stood against President Mahinda Rajapakse in the country`™s presidential elections held on Tuesday.

Anil Bhat, a retired Army officer, is a defence and security analyst based in New Delhi

Last month and for the first time since the end of the war in May 2009, I returned to Sri Lanka. Of course I could hear the drumbeats. The UNHRC, human rights bodies, Tamil Nadu politicians, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora but even New Delhi drawing rooms: Everyone outside Sri Lanka was caught in the throes of loud, vociferous rage.

`Damn Sri Lanka, damn the Rajapaksas and damn the Sri Lankan Army `” all three for `genocide`, the Indian head of a US foundation in Delhi told me firmly. Did she mean all 2,00,000 casualties of the war were inflicted by the SLA? Or the reported 40,000 war refugees killed during the last two weeks of the civil war in Mullaithivu? Did she know that the LTTE killed anyone who tried to surrender and pushed human shields ahead of them, firing as they retreated and prompting the Army `” as any fighting force would do against armed terrorists `” to retaliate ? That those poor people who were killed may have been victims of `collateral damage`™? Why didn`™t the UN conduct its own forensic tests on the material provided by a private television channel as `evidence`™ of human rights abuse by Sri Lankan troops, instead of accepting it as the Gospel truth? Why didn`™t the person who distribute the pictures do so to all those interested so we could conduct our own investigation and then comment?

Is the Geneva Convention only applicable to the Sri Lankan army, because it happens to be the only one available, since Sri Lanka is a signatory and the LTTE leadership is dead? What about the LTTE`™s overseas support groups who funded its weapons? Why not try them? For supporting a group which sent children into combat in suicide vests and with cyanide capsules around their necks? The lady had no clue. No, she had never set foot in Sri Lanka but how did that matter? I should shut up.

My trip to Sri Lanka last month was full of surprises. The North and Northeast are being developed at an astounding pace. My driver was a former SLA soldier. In the staff quarter of my Mannar hotel, he had to share a room with a former Tamil Tiger. Four years ago, the two boys would have killed each other without remorse. Now they played carrom, ate together and `” awkwardly embraced, when we left.

In Jaffna, I caught up with Daya Master, the former LTTE spokesman and with many other Tamil acquaintances. I asked everyone about the Rajapaksas. Opinion was like in any other country: Some liked him, others didn`™t. But all claimed `he deserved his second term because he had brought the war to an end.` Agree or disagree, it`™s their country, their vote.

But what about the international Tamil diaspora`™s dangerous persistence with Eelam?

`All blah-blah`, said Daya Master dismissively, like the others I spoke to. `They have done nothing for us and neither has Tamil Nadu. They should leave us alone now.`

Last month, I filed three stories for prominent Indian media houses. Two were interviews (with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and Daya Master, who incidentally is a free bird). The third was an opinion.

Abuse flew. I am a `paid`™ journalist, I was a `guest`™ of the Rajapaksas (I wish! I am still reeling from my credit card bills in increasingly expensive Sri Lanka), a Tamil-hater, a Sinhala-hater, etc.

An Indian publisher displayed great enthusiasm for a book on Sri Lanka. I sent a proposal. The reaction was predictable. They only wanted one which did not `gloss over the truth`™. (Read: A `truth`™ that would ensure good international sales, never mind the small matter of veracity and what Sri Lankans are thinking themselves).

On 12 August 2005, around 2300 (UTC+6), Kadirgamar was shot by an LTTE sniper in Colombo as he was getting out of the swimming pool at his private residence in Cinnamon Gardens. Early reports indicate he was shot twice in the head, once in the neck, and once in the body. He was rushed to the Colombo National Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. His hospital report indicates that he died as a result of his wounds. Kadirgamar on many occasions mentioned the LTTE`s threats to his life. Speaking to The Hindu on 29 July 2005, he said “They (LTTE) can get me anytime. I get very serious reports things are hotting up According to Asian Tribune, on 5 September Sri Lankan police arrested two Tamils, Muttiah Sahadevan alias Devan (Kadirgamar`s neighbour`s gardener) and Isidor Arokya Nathar alias Babu. The website alleged that they have confessed to having met Charles of the LTTE intelligence and helping out two alleged assassins. The website further claims that this is seen in some quarters in Sri Lanka as proof that the LTTE was behind his assassination.