The Naga peace talk is approaching 18 years now. A Naga child born at the time would now be in her late teens and somebody who was in her teens then would be middle aged today. Presuming leaders of the community were in their middle age at the time, they would now be aged with a foot in the grave already, and probably a lot many are already dead and gone. It is always nostalgic to look back at what was once, and the radical changes time brings to what all once believed was reality. With the turn of generations, what invariably are also ushered in are new aspirations, desires, longings, hopes, ambitions… The trouble often begins when old guards remain after the eras have changed, a problem only democracy has been somewhat able to handle, with its mechanism of mandate renewal for its leaders. If a set of leaders feel they still deserve to remain as leaders after their democratic terms end, they would have to win the mandate of the people again, otherwise, new leaders take over. We talk of the Naga situation only because there is a peculiar sense of urgency here as the Naga underground leadership have chosen to seek a solution through talks, and not because what we have said applies only to the Naga situation. It would indeed apply to those groups who still refuse to seek a negotiated settlement just as well. In the Naga situation then, because a solution is sought on a tangible forum, there are expectations that it be found without further delay. Indications are, such a `solution`™ is in the pipeline, but as to whether this `solution`™ can actually solve is the intriguing question.
At this moment then, nothing presents the problem of a changed era than the possible `solution`™ to the Naga peace talks. It is unlikely the negotiators are not mindful of another `solution`™ the Nagas had in hand 40 years ago in the Shillong Accord 1975. The accord fell through because the present generation of leaders of the NSCN(IM) rejected it. The questions foremost in the minds of critics, neutral observers as well as supporters of Naga problem, today would be, would the present `solution`™ be any different from the `solution`™ of 40 years ago? If not, who must pay for the 40 more years of sufferings, loss of lives and tearing uncertainties amongst the Nagas? Let there be no doubt, these are questions which will definitely be asked by the Nagas themselves, and the NSCN(IM) leaders must have satisfactory answers for them. The trouble also is, there is the possibility only sections of the Nagas, probably most of them from the state of Nagaland, would be asking these, introducing the further possibility of fresh divisions amongst the Nagas, just as the opposition to the Shillong Accord had caused. At this moment, it is difficult to imagine a `solution`™ which is in any way radically different from what the the Shillong Accord offered, with sovereignty probably out of any reckoning and even its placebo of Greater Nagaland in all likelihood ruled out. In this light, it may also yet be discovered that in its essence, the Naga Problem is more a Manipur Problem.
Forty years ago, the objection to the Shillong Accord appealed to a whole generation of Nagas. Forty years later, the problem is how to accommodate a similar accord and explain the objections raised 40 years ago satisfactorily in today`™s changed context. It must again be said that this however is not a problem peculiar to the Nagas alone. It applies to all other continuing insurgencies for it is the reality of any prolonged violent and traumatic struggle. Conflict resolution is also very much about resolving this internal trauma of conflict survivors, often referred to as `survivor guilt` by scholars. Because these struggles remain fixated in the logic and ideology of a particular era, the longer a struggle continues, the dichotomy between ideology and changing spirits of new eras will become wider and felt all the more painfully when a `solution`™ is sought. The 40 year question is therefore every insurrection`™s problem.
Leader Writer: Pradip Phanjoubam